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Assessment is generally not a favorite subject for many teachers, and this is likely 
due to a perceived tension between the goals they wish to accomplish as educators 
and the methods of assessments prescribed by accrediting agencies. With even 
President Obama calling for improvements in assessing education, this paper seeks 
to develop an innovative phenomenological-hermeneutic model of assessment, one 
that focuses on the first-person interpretation of one’s transformative educational 
experience. After the theoretical framework for developing this model is explained, I 
present an application of the model through the introduction of “mindful reading 
assignments.” 
 
Introduction 
 
What’s wrong with the topic 
of assessment? Why is there 
such a low level of 
engagement? Is it because 
any reflection on teaching 
and testing is at best 
secondary to the main 
pursuit of wisdom?
It would seem that, as a rule, philosophers are not particularly fond of 
assessment. Without wishing to incriminate my colleagues or myself, I take this as 
a general observation. Perhaps supporting evidence can be found in the following 
experience: At a recent divisional meeting of the American Philosophical Association 
with 1,008 members listed as participants, how many do you think attended a 
group session sponsored by the American Association of Philosophy Teachers 
devoted to the topic of assessment in Philosophy Courses?
1 As it turned out, I was 
one of two members of the audience, and awkwardly, the other member snuck out 
towards the end of the first presentation, 
while I remained. What’s wrong with the topic 
of assessment? Why is there such a low level 
of engagement? Is it because any reflection 
on teaching and testing is at best secondary 
to the main pursuit of wisdom? True, Socrates 
disavowed being a teacher and had seemingly 
little interest in assessing his disciples. If 
anything, he reasoned, they should assess 
themselves. But despite maintaining that “the 
unexamined life is not worth living,”
2 it is safe to assume that Socrates certainly 
didn’t have in mind that students should be subject to repeated standardized 
examinations.
3 Indeed, it is difficult to imagine Socrates fitting into our higher 
education system today, but perhaps this reasoning for the lack of interest in 
assessment is a bit too idealistic.  
  It is somewhat comforting to note that it is not only philosophy teachers 
who feel and think this way. As noted in a meeting I attended in the fall semester of 
2008 at the Faculty Center for Teaching and Learning (FCTL) at the University of 
Central Florida, “work with assessment [is] most of the time [work with] a hostile 
audience,” and “you’re not supposed to be grumpy unless you’re talking about 
assessment.” I admit that these reflections generally fit with my own experiences in 
working on our General Education Program (GEP) assessment and trying to get 
others interested in the process. Why all the grumpiness? If it is not because that 
we are solely interested in the isolated pursuit of truth in itself, is it rather that we 
are quite suspicious that common assessment models involving standardized direct 
measures fail to account for the whole learning experience in all its complexity?
4  
  Even our nation’s President is concerned about assessment. From the 
campaign trail in New Hampshire in November 2007 to March 10
th, 2009, when he 
unveiled his specific proposals for public education, President Obama has repeatedly 
called for “innovative assessments” (2007, p. 8).
5 Although focused primarily on K-
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develop alternative assessments that encourage our students “to become more than 
just good test-takers” and “that don’t just test isolated bits of information” (p. 8). In 
his most recent speech, Obama called on education chiefs to develop “assessments 
that don’t simply measure whether students can fill in a bubble on a test, but 
whether they possess 21
st century skills like problem-solving and critical thinking, 
entrepreneurship, and creativity” (2009, para. 23).
6 T h u s  t h e  t i m e  i s  r i p e  f o r  
thickening the discussion of assessment.  
When we focus on higher 
education, however, where 
our goal is to educate and 
not merely train our 
students, we must be wary 
of the move to more 
standardized, “direct” 
measures of quantifiable 
“outcomes.”
  When we focus on higher education, however, where our goal is to educate 
and not merely train our students, we must be wary of the move to more 
standardized, “direct” measures of quantifiable “outcomes.” Dean Adam Falk of 
Johns Hopkins University expressed his concern that assessment practices focused 
“on standardization and quantification will impel us to an impoverished vision of 
higher education that would do our nation a 
profound disservice” (2008, para. 5).
7 The 
reasoning behind this claim is based on a 
vision of the university that is centered on the 
goal of developing character and invigorating 
“the intellectual and moral forces,” as well as 
Falk’s discussions with alumni who only gain a 
clearer understanding of the significance of 
their education years after they have 
graduated. Thus Falk opposes the “new 
standardized testing regime” because it is 
clear that “a single test cannot uniformly evaluate the quality of the student 
experience, and the essential ‘value added’ of an education is not largely revealed 
by graduation” (para. 6). What is perhaps most important for this article is that 
Falk’s comments emphasize the importance of focusing on the significance of the 
educational experience as a whole and not on particular bits of knowledge or skills.
8  
  An even deeper worry is expressed by the holistic educators Sharon 
Solloway and Nancy Brooks (2004), who suggest that the “standardization and 
instrumental application of knowledge is akin to violence,” (p. 43)
9 and they call, 
following Paul Ricoeur, “for the necessity of a constant watchfulness for the ways 
our own pre-conceived notions deform our understanding and reception of other 
texts, ideas, objects and/or persons” (p. 43). “We cannot,” they note, 
“underestimate the subtle nature of this violence to deceive us into complacency” 
(p. 43). So, at the very least, we need to reflect on our assessment measures and 
be aware of the potential for violence (i.e., forcing students to think about a 
question in one particular way and to confine their answer, for example, to a limited 
number of multiple choice or rubric options).      
  In this article, I reflect on my current Scholarship of Teaching and Learning 
(SoTL) project
10, aiming to extend the discussion initiated by Solloway and Brooks 
(2004) in their paper, “Philosophical Hermeneutics and Assessment.” Here they 
offer a new model of assessment based on Hans-Georg Gadamer’s (1989) work, in 
particular his understanding of experience as Erlebnis and Erfahrung. I shall explain 
this model and attempt to add phenomenological support for it, and then consider 
how it might be applied in philosophy and humanities classes through the 
introduction of “mindful reading assignments.” Finally, I shall briefly consider the 
potential benefits of this model of assessment, as well as the nature of 
“mindfulness.”  
 
Phenomenology and Education 
 
The central subject matter of phenomenology is experience. 
“Phenomenology is concerned with attaining an understanding  and proper 
description of the experiential structure of our mental/embodied life” (Gallagher & 
Zahavi, 2008, p. 9). A phenomenological assessment will thus focus on the 
experience of the learner, the “how” of the experience more than the “what.” 
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agreed that all perception “involves an interpretation”; one does not simply receive 
information in perception (Gallagher & Zahavi, 2008, p. 9). Consequently, a “direct” 
measure of learning from a phenomenological perspective would involve an analysis 
of the first-person perspective, and a third-person, objective perspective would be 
considered derivative or indirect. This is a curious reversal of the common 
assessment practices promoted by accrediting agencies today that emphasize the 
use of so-called “direct” measures of learning designed to eliminate the perceptions 
of the learners. 
  Let me explain further and try to preempt a possible misunderstanding. 
Although phenomenologists promote the investigation of the first-person 
perspective associated with human subjectivity, it would be mistaken to consider 
this approach as either introspective or subjective. From phenomenology’s 
beginning in the writings of the founder Edmund Husserl (1859-1938) there has 
been a consistent attempt to dissociate this method from introspective psychology
11 
and to explain how it is not based on subjectivism.
12 Thus only by misunderstanding 
the phenomenological method could one think that any assessment derived from it 
would be a promotion of individualistic, subjective feelings.  
It seems to be more often 
the case than not that when 
assessing students we are 
looking for evidence of new 
facts, knowledge, and/or 
skills, rather than an 
experience of personal 
growth and transformation 
gained through engaging in 
a dialogue.
It is also important to acknowledge that Husserl and later 
phenomenologists, such as Martin Heidegger (1889-1976) and Hans-Georg 
Gadamer (1900-2002), clearly do not reject 
objective, scientific knowledge. Rather, they 
attempt to understand how such knowledge is 
constituted, and it is precisely the recognition 
that objective knowledge is a derivative 
phenomenon which shows the limitations of 
the objective, third-person perspective. In 
other words, that which is perceived (i.e., 
interpreted) as “objective” is done so by 
someone  for someone within a larger 
framework of significance and purpose. In 
short, phenomenologists have sought to 
understand this larger framework, which is referred to as the “life-world” in Husserl, 
“being-in-the-world” in Heidegger, and the “hermeneutical situation” in Gadamer. 
Any assessment practice based on a phenomenological method—which would also 
embrace a hermeneutical approach
13—would thus attempt to incorporate an 
appreciation of this larger framework and the “constitution”
14 of knowledge.    
   
Hermeneutics and Assessment 
 
The subtitle of Solloway and Brooks’ (2004) paper on “Philosophical 
Hermeneutics and Assessment” is “Discussions of Assessment for the Sake of 
Wholeness,” and in the introduction their aim is clearly stated: “We seek a healthier 
model, with greater possibilities for assessment that nourishes wholeness” (p. 43). 
In contrast, positivistic models based on “the traditional notion [that] the 
transmission of knowledge is evidence of learning” are less healthy and humane, 
because they are “designed to eliminate a student’s particular history of being” and 
silence his or her voice (p. 44). While there are certainly exceptions in assessment 
practices which do allow for the student’s understanding and history of being to be 
included (such as in portfolios), it does seem to be more often the case than not 
that when assessing students we are looking for evidence of new facts, knowledge, 
and/or skills, rather than an experience of personal growth and transformation 
gained through engaging in a dialogue. For Solloway and Brooks it is such an 
experience that allows for “the possibility of evolving wisdom and compassion” (p. 
45). Without providing evidence for this profound claim at this point in their article 
(although I think some may possibly be found in an examination of the written 
student reflections they later cite), Solloway and Brooks turn their discussion to 
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and Erfahrung.  
  Before explaining this distinction, it is important to note the following 
points, which are not addressed by Solloway and Brooks. First, Gadamer’s 
understanding of the hermeneutical process is grounded in Heidegger’s analysis of 
understanding expressed in sections 31 and 32 of Being and Time (1927), which 
describes understanding as an existential mode of being that prefigures knowing 
and asserting. Second, in Gadamer’s defining study Truth and Method, it is clear 
from the outset that he is not arguing for one conception of truth and one 
conception of method, and consequently he is not rejecting scientific “truth” and 
method, the extended development of which may lie behind the current positivistic 
tradition of assessment in what has been called “the Age of Accountability.”
15 For 
there are learning processes characterized by the acquisition of knowledge and 
skills, and thus there may be assessment models suited for these processes. 
Gadamer (1989) would have us see, however, that “there is an experience of truth 
that transcends the domain of the scientific method” (p. xxi). This is the truth 
experienced in the phenomenon of understanding, the investigation of which is the 
central focus of Gadamer’s entire study. For example, in the experience of 
understanding a work by Plato, Spinoza, or Hegel, “a truth is known that could not 
be attained in any other way, even if this contradicts the yardstick of research and 
progress by which science measures itself” (p. xxi).
16 In other words, “truth” in this 
sense is not a skill or craft (technē) or the correct conformity between the idea and 
the object (adequatio), but rather the unveiling (alētheia) of being in the self-
understanding of the seeker. Heidegger, in particular, has emphasized this 
understanding of truth and its genuine association with education (paideía). This is 
summarized nicely in Shaun Gallagher’s Hermeneutics and Education: 
…then knowledge, in Plato’s sense, is not a matter of adequatio 
but of alētheia. Adequatio is taken as an inadequate kind of truth. 
It does not constitute the truth that must be sought in the 
educational process. For Plato, education means always going 
beyond truth as adequatio. Adequatio is a characteristic of purely 
technical or intellectual—logical, mathematical, formal—
knowledge, a knowledge that lacks a moral dimension, a 
cleverness without phronēsis  [practical wisdom]. Plato is not 
ambiguous about this. Education cannot be reduced to technē or 
adequatio. It involves more than a literacy with respect to correct 
opinions. It involves a self-knowledge that changes the learner. 
(p. 200)
17 
We must realize that there 
are experiences of learning 
that transcend traditional 
assessment practices.
In light of this richer understanding of the nature of education, which is 
irreducible to technē or adequatio, it becomes 
evident that our assessment practices need to 
be enriched to account for the nature of truth 
as alētheia. Thus, we must realize that there 
are experiences of learning that transcend 
traditional assessment practices. Such 
experiences may be more obvious in the arts and humanities, which in turn would 
be the disciplines most in need of alternative models of assessment. But here it 
should be noted that in Truth and Method it was not Gadamer’s (1989) concern to 
establish a new method or system of rules on how we should proceed. Rather, he 
states: “my real concern was and is philosophic: not what we do or what we ought 
to do but what happens to us over and above our wanting and doing” (p. xxv-xxvi). 
  Let us now consider the complex distinction between Erlebnis  and 
Erfahrung,  which for Solloway and Brooks (2004) lies at the heart of their new 
holistic thinking on assessment. They begin their discussion as follows: 
While traditional notions of learning and assessment [consider/as] 
a replication and/or application as evidence of having mastered a 
pre-given body of knowledge, Erlebnis  and  Erfahrung may be 
associated with a philosophical hermeneutical notion of 
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assessment as an aesthetic experience – one in which the 
individual encounters him/herself and engages in a play across 
horizons. (p. 45)  
I  w o u l d  o f f e r  t h a t  i t  i s  r a t h e r  r a r e  t h a t  w e  c o n s i d e r  a s s e s s m e n t  a s  a n  a e s t h e t i c  
experience, and I would like us to keep this idea in mind, while taking both 
“aesthetic” and “experience” in the broadest senses.
18 For Gadamer, it seems, the 
aesthetic experience par excellence is an engagement with a literary text,
19 and 
surely any course offered at the university, whether science or humanities, is going 
to include this experience. It will also include the aesthetic experience of engaging 
the oral tradition given through the language of the instructor, so “aesthetic 
assessment” may be applicable to all disciplines.  
  Although “Gadamer typically uses the term Erlebnis  with a critical 
overtone, and the term Erfahrung with a positive one” (1989, p. xiii), Solloway and 
Brooks (2004) argue for an interpretation that brings together both notions of 
experience. They take Erlebnis to define an immediate, particular experience that 
jolts one “out of the ordinary” and “awakens us to ourselves in a way that we 
haven’t been awakened before” (p. 46). In contrast, Erfahrung “is a way of being, a 
stance or orientation to experience in general” (p. 46). In other words, we might 
say that Erlebnis is a subjective event, “it is all about ME; it happens TO me” (p. 
46).  Erfahrung  moves beyond subjectivity to an understanding that is radically 
undogmatic, one in which I understand my experiences not as “isolated moments, 
but an ongoing integrative process in which what we encounter widens our horizon” 
(Gadamer, 1989, p. xiii). For Gadamer, “the dialectic of experience has its proper 
fulfillment not in a definitive knowledge but in the openness to experience that is 
made possible by experience itself” (p. 355). It would seem, then, that this 
openness to ever-widening horizons allows for the possibility of transformation, in 
which one transcends one’s isolated subjectivity—but one does not eliminate it—to 
become an integrated part of the whole.  
          
Theory in Practice: Mindful Reading Assignments 
 
“What assessment practices might be invented by teachers who are 
interested in drawing students toward their own hermeneutic imagination?...toward 
their own growth in appreciation of the wholeness and integrity of the world?” 
(Solloway & Brooks, 2004, p. 50). This is the question posed by Solloway and 
Brooks, and answered by the different model of assessment they propose, one that 
does not eliminate “the idiosyncrasies of personal relevance, cultural context, and 
historical context,” but rather allows “students to bring their personal histories to 
the table” (p. 51). The assessment designed by Solloway is a “self-evaluation” 
assessment of learning, which is claimed to have “demonstrated a texture of 
‘mindfulness’” (p. 58). 
The merit of this initiative lies in its innovative use of philosophical 
hermeneutics as a model of assessment. It opens assessment to 
the possibilities of a holistic notion of mindfulness – observing the 
mind in its processes. Perhaps, this accounts for the responses 
that describe learning as if it is a new experience. Mindfulness 
practitioners often describe ordinary experience as having a 
keenness – a sense of vibrancy not noticed without mindfulness. 
(p. 58)   
Following this initiative, I have designed what I call “Mindful Reading Assignments” 
for my Introduction to Philosophy classes, and have just begun asking my students 
to complete them during the 2008-2009 academic year. A short description of the 
Mindful Reading Assignment (MRA) is this: 
Throughout the course students will be required to submit four 
MRAs in which they (1) identify a passage from an assigned 
reading that has affected (deepened, qualified, confirmed, raised 
new questions, etc.) the way they think and (2) explain the significance of the passage (e.g., its difficulty, originality, insight, 
truthfulness, etc.) and how their thinking has been affected 
(deepened, qualified, confirmed, raised new questions, etc.). The 
assignments should include the passage and reference (singled-
spaced, use ellipses if more than 50 words) and the explanation 
(double-spaced, 250 to 500 words). 
The focus of this assignment 
is not on demonstrating 
knowledge about the 
content or argument found 
in a particular text, but 
rather in demonstrating that 
one has been open to letting 
the text engage oneself, and 
has been transformed 
through an interpretation of 
both oneself and the text. 
The focus of this assignment is not on demonstrating knowledge about the 
content or argument found in a particular text (although this inevitably happens 
along the way), but rather in demonstrating that one has been open to letting the 
other (in this case the text) engage oneself, 
and has been transformed through an 
interpretation of both oneself and the text. In 
Gadamerian terms this would exhibit a “kind 
of play, a back and forth or to and fro 
movement” (Solloway & Brooks, 2004, p. 45) 
that is the unveiling or truth of being, which is 
not entirely objective (since the focus is not 
on getting the text right) or entirely subjective 
(since the focus is not solely on what the 
student thinks alone). Rather the focus is on 
the encounter in which the object and subject 
become merged, and both are transcended in the process, that is, in the 
experience. How exactly this happens through the activity of reading might be 
considered in some sense “miraculous,”
20 and yet Gadamer’s ontological 
explanation of the work of art goes a long way in clarifying this “miracle.” As 
Gadamer understands it, the concept of play is the clue to the ontological 
explanation. This means that the mode of being of play helps us to understand the 
mode of being of the work of art, which “is not an object that stands over and 
against a subject for itself” (p. 103). Instead, 
the work of art has its true being in the fact that it becomes an 
experience that changes the person who experiences it. The 
“subject” of the experience of art, that which remains and 
endures, is not the subjectivity of the person who experiences it 
but the work itself. (p. 103)  
From this line of thought one may understand that when we attempt to 
assess the student’s experience of the work of art by focusing on the changes 
undergone, we are also assessing the work of art itself understood as experience. 
For perhaps the most significant part of Gadamer’s work in understanding the 
process of understanding and interpretation—at least if one considers that it is the 
part most often anthologized—readers should turn to the first section of “Elements 
of a Theory of Hermeneutic Experience” in which the hermeneutic circle and the 
conception of prejudices are explained. Relevant to the current discussion is this 
description of the hermeneutical circle: 
The circle, then, is not formal in nature. It is neither subjective 
nor objective, but describes understanding as the interplay of the 
movement of tradition and the movement of the interpreter. The 
anticipation of meaning that governs our understanding of a text 
is not an act of subjectivity, but proceeds from the commonality 
that binds us to the tradition. (p. 293)
21  
  In an attempt to apply these theoretical concerns to the assessment 
process, the plan for my SoTL project is to compare classes which are asked to 
complete MRAs with those that are not, and to see what, if any, significant 
differences emerge. My expectation would naturally be that the use of MRAs would 
lead to an enhanced learning experience that would also result in improved results 
on other more traditional assessments, such as multiple choice and short answer 
tests. I am also interested in surveying students to find out which method of 
assessment they find most valuable, but here I am not sure what to expect. 
Students who are used to traditional assessment measures may not think that the 
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only at the beginning of my study using the intervention of MRAs as an alternative 
assessment model. Whether the results will provide “an opening for transformation” 
as presented by Solloway and Brooks (2004) remains to be seen, as also whether it 
will be possible to categorize the student responses by the following six themes: 
“new energy/excitement for learning, new visions of how they want to enact 
teaching and learning, new ways of being in the world, new wisdom about 
themselves, new experience of learning, [and] concrete horizons” (p. 52).
22  
 
Conclusion: In Media Res 
 
The major goals of this paper have been to provide a theoretical 
background for my SoTL project and a description of the new application of MRAs. 
Thus my study is “in the middle of things,” as all data has not yet been collected, 
and the data that has been collected does not represent two comparable courses 
which would yield statistically significant results. Initially, due to my class schedule, 
the study focused on two different sections of PHI 2010, Introduction to Philosophy. 
Group 1 consisted of 18 honors students in the fall semester of 2008, and Group 2 
consisted of 75 general students in the spring semester of 2009. Both groups had 
the same reading material from Plato, Spinoza, Kierkegaard, and Nietzsche, while 
Group 1 was asked to complete four “mindful reading assignments” throughout the 
course and Group 2 was not. Both groups also took the same three tests containing 
multiple choice, true/false, and essay questions.
23 
Helping students 
understand this focus on the 
experience, which is not 
simply objective or 
subjective, showed itself to 
be the greatest challenge in 
implementing this 
assessment.
  Initially, it appeared that students in Group 1 were more comfortable 
writing expository or reflective pieces, rather than being able to describe their 
reading experiences and how their thinking was changed in the process. This is 
reflected in 56% of the class earning full credit 
for the first two MRAs compared to 67% 
earning full credit in the last two MRAs. As 
suggested above, the goal of these 
assignments is neither a straightforward 
exposition of the text (this would be the 
predominantly objective focus) nor a personal 
explanation why a student liked a particular 
passage (this would be the predominantly 
subjective focus), but rather a careful 
description of how a student’s consciousness has been changed in the experience of 
reading the text. Helping students understand this focus on the experience, which is 
not simply objective or subjective, showed itself to be the greatest challenge in 
implementing this assessment. Students needed to be reminded to attempt to 
express directly how they thought about a particular issue prior to reading the text 
and how they then thought about it after reading the text. In doing this students 
were being asked to come to self-knowledge about their own being-in-the-world, 
and the greatest aid to students in this regard was to read to the class those MRAs 
that succeeded best in achieving the goals of the assignment.     
  It does seem that students in Group 1 were satisfied with the MRAs as a 
method of assessment. In the free response section of the student perception of 
instruction forms, 11 of 14 students (79%) responded favorably to the question: 
“What is your reaction to the method of evaluating your mastery of the course?”
24 
Although the majority of comments received were rather general (such as “grading 
was fair”) and this question refers to all assessment measures including tests (which 
was interestingly the only measure receiving negative comments, while there were 
no negative comments regarding the MRAs), three students (21%) commented 
positively and without any prompting regarding the MRAs in particular. One student 
even put down “MRAs” for “The thing(s) I like the MOST about this course,” and 
another student wrote: “I enjoyed the required reading and believe the assignments 
in the class helped me to better understand the material.” Further, the following 
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unsolicited message from a student in Group 1 was received about a third of the 
way through the course. This message speaks for itself: 
Professor Strawser,  
I am participating in the 40 day challenge "Yes, I Believe in God." 
Today's daily "challenge" is to write a letter of appreciation to 
someone with general authority over us. I just wanted to thank 
you for being so open minded with our Intro to Philosophy class 
and for actually caring about what we think. Many teachers only 
expect you to read the information and complete the assignment. 
By giving us the "Mindful Reading Assignments" you are proving 
to the class that you actually do care about how the course is 
affecting us. That is more than just working for your paycheck. 
While, to you, these mindful reading assignments seem like trivial 
pieces of work that every class should instate, the truth is that 
many professors don't care about their students as individuals. 
Thank you again. 
Whatever the outcome of a statistical survey of the data, this study has 
been significant because I have become more mindful of my own assessment 
practices as a teacher and more open to letting myself be transformed by the 
students’ observations. The MRAs have already provided a pedagogical benefit in 
that they allow students to determine which passages they find significant rather 
than the ones I (and the tradition I am following) find significant, and when these 
passages become the focus of our discussion and analysis, or when the students’ 
reflections provide new questions for their own research papers (which I suspect will 
happen), it broadens the horizons of us all. Thus I am already starting to realize 
that using a phenomenological-hermeneutic model of assessment may also provide 
the opportunity for transformation that Erfahrung offers for the teacher.  
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would hardly be akin to the kind of standardized practices we have today. It is 
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President-to-the-United-States-Hispanic-Chamber-of-Commerce/, May 29, 2009. 
7 Adam Falk, “Assessing Assessment,” Johns Hopkins University Arts & Sciences 
Magazine Online 6.1 (Fall 2008), Accessed at 
http://krieger2.jhu.edu/magazine/f08/view.html, March 13, 2009. The title of my 
article, a version of which was presented under the same title at the Engagement in 
Undergraduate Research: Florida Statewide Symposium, University of Central 
Florida, September 26, 2008, was formulated prior to my knowledge of Falk’s 
article. 
8 This should not be taken as denying an imperative of knowledge and the 
importance of developing particular skills, just that this does not encapsulate the 
entire mission of university educators. 
9 Sharon G. Solloway and Nancy J. Brooks, “Philosophical Hermeneutics and 
Assessment: Discussions of Assessment for the Sake of Wholeness,” Journal of 
Thought 39.2 (Summer 2004): 43. Although not explicitly developed or analyzed, 
t he bac kground for t hi s  s eem ingl y ext reme vi ew is  t o be found i n Paul  Ri c ouer’s 
essay, “Violence and Language,” in Political and Social Essays, edited by David 
Stewart and Joseph Bien (Athens: Ohio University Press), 88-101. In this text, 
Ricouer seeks “to take the largest view of the realm of violence” that moves beyond 
“a very limited and very reassuring idea of violence” (murder and natural 
destruction) and considers the problem of violence in relation to language (88-89). 
In considering various manifestations of violence, Ricouer writes: 
There is finally the violence of the always premature conclusion: 
philosophy exists only in books which are always a finite work of 
the mind. Books are always brought to a close too quickly, 
intercepting the process of totalization in an arbitrary termination. 
This is why all philosophies are particular even though everything 
is to be found in any great philosophy. And as I am myself one of 
the violent particularities, it is from my particular point of view 
that I perceive all these total particularities that are also particular 
totalities. The hard road of the “loving struggle” is the only road 
possible (96-97). 
Here one may begin to understand how adopting any one particular modality of 
discourse—such as one implicit in any single, standardized test—will have a 
totalizing effect on the meaning of the discourse, such that only that discursive 
practice which fits within the context of the test is meaningful, and all other 
practices are excluded. Although what may be involved in the “loving struggle” that 
Ricouer identifies is somewhat vague, it would surely involve “respect for the 
plurality and diversity of languages,” which is what it means “to be non-violent in 
discourse” (101). As we shall see below, the particular assessment that I have 
developed seeks to respect the plurality and diversity of the hermeneutical 
experiences of students in engaging with the philosophical tradition .   
10 This project was sponsored by The Karen L. Smith Faculty Center for Teaching 
and Learning at the University of Central Florida, and I would like to thank the 
interim director, Dr. Tace Crouse, and the staff of FCTL for their support for this 
project. 
11 “Indeed, all the major figures in the phenomenological tradition have openly and 
unequivocally denied that they are engaged in some kind of introspective 
psychology and that the method they employ is a method of introspection.” This InSight:  A Journal of Scholarly Teaching                                                     65              
                                                                                                                   
clear statement is supported by significant evidence in Gallagher and Zahavi, The 
Phenomenological Mind (New York: Routledge, 2008), 21. 
12 Husserl remarks that “mere subjectivity should not be confused (as it is so 
frequently) with an experiential subjectivity, as though the perceived things in their 
perceptual qualities were themselves experiences….” Edmund Husserl, Ideas: 
General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology, translated by W. Boyce Gidson (New 
York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1962), 158.  
13 Readers should keep in mind that phenomenology and hermeneutics are 
inextricably linked, and I have often thought that it would be useful to come up with 
a term that refers to both approaches, but somehow “phermeneutics” or 
“phenomenuetics” seem unsatisfactory. One of the best discussions of the 
relationship between phenomenology and hermeneutics can be found  in 
Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences by Paul Ricouer, who attempts to make 
explicit the “mutual belonging” between phenomenology and hermeneutics. 
According to Ricour, “phenomenology remains the unsurpassable presupposition of 
hermeneutics. On the other hand, phenomenology cannot constitute itself without a 
hermeneutical presupposition.” Paul Ricoeur, Hermeneutics and the Human 
Sciences, edited and translated by John B. Thompson (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1981), 101-102. 
14 The notion of “constitution” is very important in Husserl’s writings and “expresses 
the manner in which objects of consciousness come to have the kinds of ‘sense and 
being’ that they do, the manner in which subjectivity carries out its function of 
giving sense.” Dermot Moran, Introduction to Phenomenology (London: Routledge, 
2000), 164-165. 
15 I don’t pretend to know fully the historical reasons behind assessment having 
become “a national movement with a reform agenda” and what is driving the 
accrediting agencies that are driving the accredited institutions. (Although I might 
speculate that the focus on direct measures and positivistic approaches would be 
connected to “the methodical spirit of science” that “permeates everywhere” today 
[see Gadamer’s Truth and Method, xxvi].) According to Barbara E. Walvoord and 
Virginia Johnson Anderson, “Faculty are going to have to make peace with this 
[new] paradigm [of assessment] and with the need to communicate to outsiders in 
new ways about student learning.” Effective Grading: A Tool for Learning and 
Assessment (San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass, 1998), 3.  
16 Gadamer, Truth and Method, xxi. This experience is surely not limited to 
philosophical texts, but is to be found in all works of art.  
17 Shaun Gallagher, Hermeneutics and Education (New York: State University of 
New York Press, 1992), 200. Although the topic of assessment is not directly 
addressed, Gallagher’s far-reaching work presents a detailed consideration of a 
moderate hermeneutical theory of education.  
18 I am also reminded of the meeting I attended on “Non-traditional Assessment in 
Philosophy Courses,” where one presentation by Debby Hutchins entitled “Learning 
as Constructing: Logic Art as Pedagogy” exhibited students’ works of art containing 
logical proofs. See note 1 above. 
19 Gadamer’s work clearly prioritizes the notion of text as written, as evidenced in 
this passage which explains the profound uniqueness of the engagement with a 
written text. 
At any rate, it is not by chance that literature is the place where 
art and science merge. The mode of being of a text has something 
unique and incomparable about it. It presents a specific problem 
of translation to the understanding. Nothing is so strange, and at 
the same time so demanding as the written word. …Nothing is so 
purely the trace of the mind as writing, but nothing is so 
dependent on the understanding mind either. In deciphering and 
interpreting it, a miracle takes place: the transformation of 
something alien and dead into total contemporaneity and 66                                                               Volume 4  ●  2009 
                                                                                                                   
familiarity. This is like nothing else that comes down to us from 
the past. The remnants of past life—what is left of buildings, tools, 
the contents of graves—are weather-beaten by the storms of time 
that have swept over them, whereas the written tradition, once 
deciphered and read, is to such an extent pure mind that it speaks 
to us as if in the present. That is why the capacity to read, to 
understand what is written, is like a secret art, even a magic that 
frees and binds us. In it time and space seem to be superseded. 
People who can read what has been handed down in writing 
produce and achieve the sheer presence of the past (Truth and 
Method, 156). 
20 See the passage in the previous note where Gadamer refers to the act of reading 
as involving a miracle. 
21 Readers familiar with Louise Rosenblatt’s transactional theory of the literary work 
may notice an affinity between Rosenblatt’s perspective and Gadamer’s, for both 
writers focus their theories on the experience of the work of art as an event, rather 
than on the author or the text itself. In Literature as Exploration (1938) Rosenblatt 
analyzes “The Literary Experience” (Chapter 2) and argues that “the teacher’s task 
is to foster fruitful interpretations—or, more precisely transactions—between 
individual readers and literary works.” I think it is fair to say that both authors are 
concerned with what Rosenblatt refers to as “the uniqueness of the transaction 
between reader and text” (which may be related to Gadamer’s notion the historicity 
of the understanding), and that this concern, as Rosenblatt puts it, “is not 
inconsistent with he fact that both elements in this relationship [reader and text] 
have social origins and social effects” (which would be captured by Gadamer’s 
understanding of everything that belongs to “tradition”). See Louise M. Rosenblatt, 
Literature as Exploration, 4
th ed. (New York: The Modern Language Association of 
America, 1978), 26-27. Further agreement may be found in understanding the 
reader as “productive” or “creative” in the interpretative process, and of particular 
interest in this context is Rosenblatt’s focus on experience. She explains the value 
of literature “as a means of enlarging [students’] knowledge of the world, because 
through literature [students] acquire not so much additional information  as 
additional  experience. New understanding is conveyed to them dynamically and 
personally. Literature provides a living-through, not simply knowledge about” 
(Literature as Exploration, 38, author’s italics).  
     It  is  rather  surprising  that  there has been little if any discussion of the 
relationship between these theories and neither Gadamer nor Rosenblatt, as far as I 
can tell, acknowledges the other’s work in their texts. Rosenblatt, however, admits 
that she was not interested in the phenomenologists (she only mentions Husserl by 
name and seems to consider all of phenomenology as tainted by idealism, which is 
surely an unfair criticism of Heidegger, Gadamer, Ricouer, and several other major 
phenomenologists), perhaps because she had been so taken by the pragmatists, in 
particular the work of John Dewey. See Louise M. Rosenblatt, The Reader, the Text, 
the Poem: The Transactional Theory of the Literary Work (Carbondale, Illinois: 
Southern Illinois University Press, 1978), xiv. The first chapter of this later work 
deals with “The Poem as Event,” and offers the following key passage which fits 
nicely with Gadamer’s understanding: “The poem, then, must be thought of as an 
event in time. It is not an object or an ideal entity. It happens during a coming-
together, a compenetration, of a reader and a text” (The Reader, the Text, the 
Poem, 12). 
22 Solloway and Brooks studied students taking an undergraduate teacher education 
required course, and while all significant, I find Solloway and Brooks explanation of 
the first category—“New Energy/Excitement for Learning”—to be particularly 
exciting as it parallels some of the responses that I expect to emerge from my 
study. They explain: InSight:  A Journal of Scholarly Teaching                                                     67              
                                                                                                                   
At the beginning of the semester, many of the students expressed 
anxiety at being in charge of selecting what would count as 
learning for them from the assigned readings. (…) It was hard for 
these students to “think” about their learning, to think about how 
the text had affected their thinking. They were habituated to 
playing the game of school where it is the student’s task to guess 
what in the reading would be important to the teacher, not what 
in the reading was important to them.  
Once they began to give themselves permission to hear their own 
voices, it was cause for new excitement about learning. This was 
best expressed in these phrases from one student’s responses 
“Another thing I’m learning is how to be excited about my own 
thinking…I feel myself watching for how the words are going to 
affect me as I read them…” (p. 53). 
23 Here are the test results. Students in Group 1 who completed four MRAs 
throughout the course averaged 90% on Test # 1, 91% on Test # 2, and 92% on 
Test # 3. Students in Group 2 averaged 76% on Test # 1, 77% on Test # 2, and 
78% on Test # 3. Obviously, since Group 1 consisted of a small section of honors 
students and Group 2 consisted of a large section of general students, we cannot 
attribute the significance in higher test scores to the implementation of the MRAs 
alone. Thus, I am looking forward to teaching two similar sections on Introduction 
to Philosophy in order to gather more reliable data. 
24 Two students offered no response. 
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